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INTRODUCTION
In the event that a vaccine is available
in time to respond to an influenza pan-
demic [1], the safety profile of such a vac-
cine will likely be less certain than that of
previously released influenza vaccines. As
such, the safety of this vaccine will need to
be closely monitored. In order to appreci-
ate the scientific and ethical issues
involved in ensuring vaccine safety, it is
important to understand the historical con-
text and current scientific framework of
United States immunization safety activi-
ties. This paper will then briefly summa-
rize the current state of knowledge regard-
ing the safety of inactivated influenza vac-
cines (IIV)†. It will conclude with limited
discussion of some ethical aspects of safe-
ty monitoring, as well as key scientific and
programmatic challenges that must be
faced to assure the safety of a pandemic
influenza vaccine.
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In the event that a vaccine is available during an influenza pandemic, vaccine safety mon-
itoring will occur as part of comprehensive public health surveillance of the vaccination
campaign. Though inactivated influenza vaccines have been widely used in the United
States and much is known about their safety profile, attention will need to be paid to both
common self-limited adverse reactions and rarer, more serious events that may or may not
be causally related to vaccination. The primary surveillance systems used to generate and
test hypotheses about vaccine safety concerns are the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting
System (VAERS) and the Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD), respectively. Examples of recent
use of these systems to investigate influenza vaccine safety and enhancements planned
for use during a pandemic are presented. Ethical issues that will need to be addressed as
part of an overall vaccine safety response include risk communication and injury compen-
sation. Advance planning and the use of available technologic solutions are needed to
respond to the scientific and logistic challenges involved in safely implementing mass vac-
cination during a pandemic.BACKGROUND
Vaccine-preventable disease surveil-
lance encompasses surveillance for disease
burden, vaccination coverage, and vaccine
adverse events [2]. Given the likelihood that
limited amounts of vaccine may initially be
available in the early phases of a pandemic,
and having seen the recent experience with
the 2004-05 influenza vaccine shortage, pri-
oritizing and tracking of vaccine supply also
will be important. Vaccine safety monitor-
ing will need to be an integral part of com-
prehensive surveillance of the pandemic
influenza vaccination program [3].
Mass vaccination campaigns, like
those that will occur during an influenza
pandemic, may be accompanied by vaccine
safety concerns. The “Cutter Incident,”
which resulted in cases of poliomyelitis due
to inadequately inactivated polio vaccine in
the 1950s, is an important historical exam-
ple of safety concerns that arose in the
course of a mass vaccination campaign
[4,5]. A more recent example involved the
1976-77 swine influenza (“swine flu”) vac-
cine and its association with Guillain-Barré
Syndrome (GBS) [6]. Whether such con-
cerns are scientifically validated or not,
they have the potential to adversely affect
public acceptance of vaccination, especial-
ly when there is extensive media coverage
[7]. The ability to study and address these
concerns is one of the primary reasons for
havingrobustsystemsforassessingvaccine
safety.
Unlike vaccine efficacy and effective-
ness, vaccine safety cannot be directly
measured. Instead, it is inferred from the
relative absence of adverse events. An
adverse event following immunization is
“…a medical incident that takes place
after an immunization, causes concern and
is believed to be caused by the immuniza-
tion” [8]. This definition does not imply
any proven causal connection to vaccina-
tion. The term “adverse reactions” refers
to untoward effects of vaccination unrelat-
ed to the vaccine’s primary purpose [9].
Formal epidemiologic study is usually
required to distinguish between coinciden-
tal adverse events and causally related
adverse reactions [10]. In rare instances,
proof of causality may also be obtained by
the finding of a unique clinical syndrome
or laboratory result that would not occur in
the absence of vaccination.The rare occur-
rence of vaccine-associated paralytic polio
(VAPP) with isolation of vaccine virus
strain derived from oral poliovirus vaccine
(OPV) is a notable example [11].
CHARACTERISTICS OF
INFLUENZA VACCINES
Because influenza vaccines often
have different antigenic compositions
from year to year, the safety of annual
influenza vaccines may vary slightly.
Unlike annual influenza vaccines, whose
composition includes two circulating A
strains and one B strain [12], the pandem-
ic influenza vaccine is projected to be a
monovalent vaccine. Most influenza vac-
cines are given as a single dose per season
[12]. In contrast, it is widely anticipated
that vaccination with the pandemic strain-
based vaccine will require two doses given
four weeks apart [13]. The need for a two-
dose strategy will need to be taken into
account in planning for safety monitoring.
The current egg-based influenza vac-
cine production technology is constrained
by the availability of eggs and is labor-
intensive and time-consuming. New meth-
ods of producing vaccines are being devel-
oped. The main effort is to develop cell-
culture methods, providing the capacity of
a rapid vaccine production scale-up [14,
15]. Cell-based technology has potential
safety issues; these include the possibly
unknown biological properties of viruses
that may be latent in cell lines, and of sol-
vents, emulsifiers, and preservatives used
during cell line and vaccine production.
The remote possibility of low-level vac-
cine contamination by bovine or porcine
viruses, or prions derived from cell culture
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vaccines using cell-derived technologies
may require long-term follow-up to ensure
their safety [17].
Vaccines are manufactured in batches
referred to as lots. Although production fol-
lows rigorous quality control processes, bac-
terial contamination is possible, as occurred
attheChironplantinLiverpoolin2004[18].
Although all lots have to pass stringent safe-
ty standards [19], inherent biological vari-
ability from lot to lot might manifest itself as
a difference in the safety profile [20].
TYPES OF ADVERSE EVENTS
STUDIED
Local and mild systemic reactions,
including pain and swelling at the injec-
tion site and fever, are relatively common
following inactivated vaccines such as IIV
but are almost always self-limited [2].
Such adverse reactions are readily attribut-
able to vaccination [10, 21], and their rate
of occurrence can often be estimated from
pre-licensure studies [12]. While minor
unexpected reactions have occurred with
past influenza vaccines [22], it is likely
that during an influenza pandemic less
attention will be paid to self-limited
adverse events.
Because of limits in the size of vac-
cine trials, rare, potentially serious adverse
reactions may not be detected before licen-
sure and/or more widespread use of a spe-
cific vaccine [20, 23]. These include
immediate allergic reactions (anaphylax-
is), which may be related to either an
active vaccine component or an additive
[2].Thankfully, true anaphylactic reactions
appear to be very infrequent across vaccine
types [24]. Despite extensive worldwide
experience with use of influenza vaccines,
the possibility of heretofore undescribed
adverse reactions occurring following
widespread use of a pandemic strain
influenza vaccine must be considered.
Though GBS has not been consistent-
ly associated with influenza vaccines used
after 1976-77, there will be a need to mon-
itor occurrence of GBS following use of
pandemic influenza vaccine. Surveillance
systems have been in place to detect post-
vaccination GBS for at least the past 15
years [25]. Because of the rarity of this
event, epidemiologic study of causal attri-
bution may be difficult [26].
Particularly in mass vaccination cam-
paigns, there may be concern about vac-
cine administration errors. Observing stan-
dard immunization practices may reduce
the occurrence of such incidents [9, 27].
Because of the potential for serious errors,
such as substitution of a therapeutic
injectable product for a vaccine [28], sur-
veillance for preventable vaccine misad-
ministration may be warranted.
Systematic study will often find that
adverse events may be related to vaccina-
tion only temporally without evidence of a
causal relationship. The initial signal of
concern related to the swine flu vaccine
did not involve GBS, but rather a cluster
of myocardial infarctions that was subse-
quently found to be a temporal coinci-
dence [6]. A more recent example involv-
ing influenza vaccine involves asthma
exacerbations, which were found to be
related not to vaccination, but to underly-
ing disease severity [29].
VACCINE SAFETY DATA
REQUIREMENTS AND CURRENT
PUBLIC HEALTH
INFRASTRUCTURE
The fundamental data needed to study
vaccine safety is knowledge of the rate of
the adverse event being studied in the vac-
cinated compared to the unvaccinated indi-
viduals [30]. The known or hypothesized
risk window following vaccination, which
is analogous to the incubation period for an
infectious disease, must also be taken into
account. The risk window might corre-
spond to the peak period of viral replica-
tion following use of a live attenuated viral
vaccine such as measles/mumps/rubella
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was typically done in the past using
resource intensive ad hoc studies [32-34].
The public health systems used to
monitor the safety of vaccines trace their
origins to the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986 [35]. The Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System
(VAERS) serves as an “early warning”
system for potential vaccine safety con-
cerns [36]. It is jointly operated by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
VAERS is a passive surveillance system in
which reporting occurs at the national
level, rather than locally as with commu-
nicable diseases. Reports may be submit-
ted by health care providers, patients, state
and local health departments, or by any
person who wishes to report an adverse
event following vaccination.
VAERS has well-described strengths
and limitations. The system collects reports
nationallyandhasbeenabletorapidlydetect
rare events in a cost-effective manner. It is
alsosimple:Healthcareprovidersorpatients
only have to fill out a one-page form and
mail or fax the report to a centralized office.
SecureelectronicreportingviatheInternetis
also available [37]. VAERS allows the rapid
generation of hypotheses that can be further
tested in controlled studies.VAERS has suc-
cessfully alerted public health authorities
about safety concerns involving rotavirus,
yellow fever, and smallpox vaccines, among
others [38-40]. Additionally, when concerns
have arisen about the need to monitor a spe-
cific lot of vaccine, VAERS data have
proven useful [41].
It is important to recognize that
VAERS is subject to under-reporting,
reporting biases (which may be related to
media coverage) and reporting of events
that are unconfirmed or incompletely
described [42]. The degree of underreport-
ing of a specific type of event is not rou-
tinely known, though serious events are
more likely to be reported [43, 44]. Case
definitions developed by the Brighton
Collaboration, an international voluntary
organization, provide some assurance that
adverse events are counted and catego-
rized in a standardized manner [45]. In its
current configuration, the VAERS system
does not permit calculation of incidence
rates of adverse events in a population.
A variety of data systems is used to
assess the distribution of influenza vac-
cines or estimate the number of persons
who have been vaccinated.This denomina-
tor information helps to provide context to
numbers of reports received by VAERS.
These include Biologics Surveillance data
derived from vaccine manufacturers [41],
population-based immunization coverage
surveys such as the National Immunization
Survey [46], and U.S. Census population
estimates. There is no nationwide registry
of the number of people who annually
receive influenza vaccine.
Concerns that emerge from VAERS
may be either confirmed [47] or refuted
[48] by subsequent study. The primary
mechanism used for vaccine safety
hypothesis testing is the Vaccine Safety
Datalink (VSD). The VSD project is a col-
laboration between CDC and several geo-
graphically diverse health maintenance
organizations (HMOs); it collects informa-
tion on enrollees’ vaccination status,
health outcomes, and demographic charac-
teristics. The VSD covers about 3 percent
of the U.S. population [49]. VSD allows
assessment of the rate with which medical
events occur in both vaccinated and
unvaccinated persons. Verification of
diagnoses coded in automated data can be
accomplished through chart review, and
the VSD has been used for studies needed
to answer urgent public health questions,
most notably when it confirmed the asso-
ciation of intussusception with the first
U.S. licensed rotavirus vaccine [47].
However, even a large database such
as the VSD may not be sufficiently power-
ful for detection of extremely rare events
such as GBS [R. Davis, personal commu-
nication]. Other limitations include limited
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have outside of the HMO setting and
potential lack of demographic diversity of
the covered population. Because HMOs
tend to be early adopters of vaccines due
to their emphasis on preventive interven-
tions, specific studies may have relatively
small unvaccinated populations.
CURRENT STATUS OF
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SAFETY
OF INFLUENZA VACCINES
From January 1, 1990, through
December 31, 2004, VAERS received
20,193 reports involving influenza vac-
cine. Figure 1 indicates the increase in
influenza vaccine associated reports to
VAERS, which has occurred in parallel
with increased vaccine distribution. For the
2003-04 influenza season, nearly 3,000
influenza vaccine adverse event reports
were received. This spontaneously report-
ed safety data spans across age groups
(Figure 2); the number of reports among
children has recently increased following
expanded vaccine recommendations. Both
VSD and VAERS have recently published
safety reviews of IIV in children [46, 50],
with both reviews indicating a favorable
safety profile. The most commonly report-
ed adverse events in both children and
adults are local and mild systemic reac-
tions, similar to those described in clinical
trials of influenza vaccines (Table 1).
GUILLAIN-BARRÉ SYNDROME
AND INFLUENZA VACCINES
GBS is an acute, immune-mediated,
paralytic disorder of the peripheral nervous
system. The estimated annual incidence
ranges from 0.4 to 4.0 per 100,000 persons
[51]. From 20 to 40 percent of all GBS
cases are associated with Campylobacter
jejuni infections [52]. Concerns about the
risk of developing GBS after influenza vac-
cination have been present since the associ-
ation was first noticed during 1976-77
“swine flu” vaccination campaign. Among
persons who received the A/New Jersey
swine influenza vaccine, the rate of GBS
exceeded the background rate by slightly
less than 10 cases per million persons vac-
cinated; this corresponded to relative risks
that ranged from 4.0 to 7.6 for the six- or
eight-week period after vaccination [32].
A two-fold increase in the number of
cases of GBS after the receipt of influenza
vaccine was reported to VAERS during the
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Figure 1. Influenza reports to VAERS by vaccination date, 1/1/1990 to 12/31/04.1993-94 influenza season. The CDC and
the University of Maryland School of
Medicine undertook a collaborative investi-
gation to estimate the relative risks associ-
ated with vaccination against influenza dur-
ing the 1992-93 and 1993-94 seasons. The
overall risk for the two seasons was 1.7 (95
percent CI: 1.0 to 2.8; p = .04) during the
six weeks following vaccination, indicating
an attributable risk of slightly more than
one additional case of GBS per million per-
sons vaccinated [26]. More recently,
VAERS researchers have demonstrated a
consistent decrease in GBS reports over
time, during a period when overall flu vac-
cine adverse event reporting and dose dis-
tribution was increasing [25]. This decrease
in influenza vaccine-associated GBS
reports was consistent across all age groups
(Figure 3). However, symptom onset inter-
val and preceding illness characteristics fol-
lowing influenza vaccination suggested the
possibility of a causal relationship.
In 2003, the Institute of Medicine
concluded that evidence was inadequate to
accept or reject a causal relationship
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Figure 2. VAERS influenza vaccine reports by age, 1990 to 2004.
Table 1. Most frequently reported influenza vaccine adverse events*:
VAERS 1990 to 2004.
Children (<18 years old):
• Reactions at the injection site
• Fever
• Pain and swelling at the injection site
• Vasodilatation (flushing)
Adults (>18 years old):
• Reactions at the injection site
• Vasodilatation
• Fever
• Pain
• Myalgia (muscle aches)
*Reports may involve more than one adverse eventbetween GBS in adults and influenza vac-
cines administered after 1976, but recom-
mended utilizing new laboratory tech-
niques to re-examine the swine flu vaccine
in order to better understand the patho-
physiologic basis of swine flu vaccine-
induced GBS [53]. The CDC is currently
funding a study that is looking at a variety
of hypotheses related to whether the vac-
cine virus, another vaccine component, or
potential bacterial contamination with
Campylobacter jejuni was responsible for
causing swine flu vaccine-associated GBS.
OTHER SERIOUS ADVERSE
EVENTS OF POTENTIAL
SIGNIFICANCE
Bell’s palsy (BP) is a paralysis of the
nerves of the face from which people tend
to recover fully. In 2000-01, BPwas associ-
ated with a Swiss-licensed inactivated viro-
somal subunit intranasal influenza vaccine,
a product that was never licensed or used in
this country [54]. It contained Escherichia
coli heat-labile toxin as a mucosal adjuvant,
which may have been responsible for the
development of BP[55]. When a follow-up
study in VAERS indicated the possibility of
an association between IIV and BP [56], a
population-based VSD study was launched
to assess the validity of this hypothesized
link. This example illustrates the potential
for conducting coordinated studies within
VAERS and the VSD.
Allergic reactions are typically accept-
ed to be causally related to vaccination.
The evidence indicates that episodes of
anaphylaxis (and allergic reactions in gen-
eral) are quite rare following all vaccines
[24], though studies specifically quantify-
ing the influenza vaccine associated risk
have not been done in adults. Rare but seri-
ous anaphylactic reactions may very well
be related to the vaccine’s egg protein con-
tent, and persons with known allergy to
eggs should not be vaccinated [12].
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA VACCINE SAFETY
Basic assumptions about pandemic
influenza vaccine include high demand,
limited supply, need for vaccine priorities,
possible use of new technologies, and dis-
tribution prior to thorough evaluation of
the product’s safety profile. A vaccine
safety surveillance system will have to
anticipate possible problems while con-
ducting effective surveillance of the prod-
uct during its use. The need to detect
adverse events in a timely manner will
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Figure 3. GBS reporting rates by age and influenza season, VAERS 1990-2004.need to be balanced against issues of dis-
ease severity and vaccine efficacy.
For any licensed vaccine, a Vaccine
Information Statement (VIS) is the legally
mandated document that must be provided
to individuals prior to vaccination.
Informed consent is not formally required.
The VIS for a pandemic influenza vaccine
would likely be similar to that for current-
ly licensed influenza vaccines, in which
there is discussion of both common and
rare side effects of vaccination [57].
Patients who have experienced prior
GBS are currently considered to have a pre-
caution to further vaccination, meaning that
the risks and benefits must be weighed for
each individual patient. Though GBS is a
serious condition, requiring hospitalization
and often intensive care, it is rare. In con-
trast to the swine flu vaccination campaign
which caused fewer than one GBS case per
100,000 vaccinees, influenza contributes to
an annual average of 36,000 deaths and
more than 200,000 hospitalizations [58, 59].
A pandemic influenza vaccination
program will likely include some provi-
sions for persons claiming vaccine-related
injuries. The Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (VICP) is a “no fault” federal pro-
gram designed to compensate individuals
thought to have been harmed by vaccines
[60].As of July 1, 2005, trivalent influenza
vaccines (inactivated) are now covered
under VICP. The 1976-77 swine influenza
vaccine campaign also was linked to a fed-
erally funded compensation program.
CONCLUSION: PANDEMIC
VACCINE SAFETY CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
Expansion of influenza vaccination in
the setting of an influenza pandemic will
pose challenges in monitoring vaccine
safety. The VAERS and VSD systems will
be on the frontline of early safety “signal
detection” should widespread use of a pan-
demic influenza vaccine occur. Since
2002, VAERS has accepted secure web-
based electronic reporting; this has result-
ed in more timely and complete adverse
event reporting [61]. VAERS will be fur-
ther enhanced through activation of an
emergency preparedness plan, which will
allow processing of much larger numbers
of reports than are currently received,
along with near real-time notification of
significant adverse events. Active surveil-
lance for adverse events, a capability
recently developed by the VSD [62], will
provide data more rapidly. In the setting of
a pandemic, analyses for specific safety
outcomes of interest, such as GBS, will be
conducted weekly. The VSD can also pro-
vide age-specific background rate data for
medical events of interest [63].
Availability of age-specific dose adminis-
tration data, which could be captured and
linked to adverse event reports by bar-cod-
ing [64], linkage to immunization reg-
istries [65], or within the VSD, would
allow calculation of adverse event rates for
persons receiving first and second doses.
Creation of additional safety infrastruc-
ture or enhancement of existing systems,
including clinical vaccine safety provider
networks [66], may be needed to meet the
safety needs of expanded influenza vaccina-
tion. Though serious events such as allergic
reactions and GBS are rare, focused study
will be required to determine if they are
causally related to vaccination. Rare risks of
potentially serious events present both sci-
entific and communication challenges [67].
Existing safety systems have success-
fully monitored a broad spectrum of
influenza vaccine-related issues. A pan-
demic vaccination campaign may well
yield more vaccine safety data of greater
complexity than is seen with annual
influenza vaccination. Key factors in con-
tinued robust surveillance will include
optimal use of new technologies, linkages
with other immunization surveillance sys-
tems, and a commitment on the part of
public health to support vaccine safety sur-
veillance proactively through advance
preparation [68].
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